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Introduction 
 
Peace operations from the 1990s have increasingly been driven by the assumption 
that conflict and social unrest can be ‘solved’ through the establishment and support 
of liberal structures. Known academically as liberal peace, this approach advocates 
the liberalisation of politics and economics, and the establishment of rule of law and 
international human rights norms, claiming such liberal structures offer the necessary 
foundation to lasting peace. This claim has become unquestioned logic for many of 
the international bodies and individual actors that participate in the peace industry 
and has led to a standardised approach to post-conflict situations. However, is this 
“peacebuilding consensus”1 justified? Does liberal peace foster sustainable peace?  
 
This thesis interrogates the concept and application of liberal peace to assess the 
extent to which liberal peacebuilding delivers on its claims and provides the 
foundations of sustainable peace. Due to the enormous size of such a project and the 
limitations of this thesis, I focus on one case study in my analysis of the liberal peace 
approach – East Timor. Relying on a single example of peacebuilding allows for a 
more in depth discussion of efforts, however, it is insufficient to draw broader 
conclusions about liberal peace. This body of research, therefore, is intended to 
contribute to existing academic work that evaluates liberal peace. Where this thesis 
deviates from existing research, however, is in the application of an immanent 
critique to assess liberal peacebuilding in East Timor.  
 
East Timor was selected as the case study because the mission was one of the most 
extensive peacebuilding efforts by the international community,2 yet East Timor has 
not emerged as a strong and stable state.
3
 The operation was a classic example of 
liberal peacebuilding which focused on creating or reforming structures in East 
Timor that, according to liberal peace logic, would support lasting peace. From 1999 
                                                
1 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 9. 
2 Jarat Chopra, "Building State-Failure in East Timor," Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2002): 
981. 
3 Ibid.: 999. 
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to 2002, the United Nations (UN) administered East Timor, and with the support of 
international donors and other agencies, assisted East Timor in its transition to 
independence. Following free and fair elections in 2001 and 2002, the UN 
announced the conclusion of its administration mission and the success of the 
project. In early 2006, the World Bank reiterated East Timor’s successful 
transformation – praising the infrastructure, government and economic activity.4 Yet, 
within weeks of the World Bank’s positive evaluation, violence had broken out on 
the streets of Dili and other urban centres.  
 
My research focuses on the claims of liberal peace, how successful liberal peace 
efforts are in practice, and gauging what effect they have on long term peace 
prospects.  In my evaluation of liberal peace and the analysis of peacebuilding efforts 
in East Timor, I make two main arguments. First, despite the prevalence of liberal 
peace and its uncritical application by international actors in post-conflict situations, 
introducing or reforming liberal structures do not automatically foster lasting peace. 
Indeed, a liberal peace approach can exacerbate social tensions and contribute to 
renewed violence, or fail to prevent a relapse of fighting. Second, despite 
weaknesses, I further argue that a liberal approach to peace has merit and the 
potential to foster durable peace, therefore, liberal peace should be reformed to 
become a more nuanced and culturally responsive form of peacebuilding. 
 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter I introduces liberal peace as a 
discourse and normative framework. The chapter then traces the emergence and 
dominance of liberal peace in UN peace operations before identifying some of the 
general criticisms of the approach. Chapter II moves on to the particular case study 
of East Timor. It begins with a brief introduction to East Timor, then discusses the 
aims of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
mission in relation to the objectives of liberal peace before employing an immanent 
critique to evaluate the liberal peace efforts. The specific issues of liberal peace in 
East Timor are then related the general criticisms laid out in Chapter I. Chapter III 
makes the case for liberal peace reform, presenting a number of recommendations. 
                                                
4 World Bank, "Closing Press Conference in Timor-Leste with Paul Wolfowitz,"  
http://go.worldbank.org/XOGCSIM1H0 (accessed 07 February 2011).  
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The final chapter offers a summary of the thesis and a brief discussion of the 
challenges for liberal peace reform.  
 
Before continuing, however, an important note must be made. Throughout this 
thesis, the English name of East Timor is intentionally used rather than the official 
Portuguese name of Timor-Leste. The naming of the newly independent state and the 
selection of national languages has proven contentious. Despite an estimated 
population of around 1.1 million people,5 East Timor is host to 16 language varieties 
and numerous dialects.6 At independence the government announced the national 
languages would be Tetum, the most commonly spoken indigenous language, and 
Portuguese, the language of dissent among rebels. This decision was controversial as 
neither language is spoken by a majority; but while Tetum became a symbolic 
unifying language under Indonesian rule,7 Portuguese has historical links to 
oppression and colonialism, and is only spoken by an elite minority.8 Rather than 
engage in the debate over language, therefore, the neutral English name East Timor 
is used.9 
 
Chapter I: Liberal Peace Theory  
 
The purpose of this research paper is to interrogate liberal peace both generally and 
in specific relation to East Timor. This chapter provides an overview of the concept 
of liberal peace. It is divided into three sections. The first section defines liberal 
peace as a framework and a discourse informing contemporary peace operations. At 
its core, liberal peace holds liberal structures foster lasting peace. The second section 
of this chapter traces the rise of liberal peace in UN operations. The final section 
                                                
5 2009 estimate. ———, "Timor-Leste Data,"  http://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste 
(accessed 20 January 2011).  
6 Kerry Taylor-Leech, "Sustaining Language Policy and Language Rights: Where to from Here," in 
East Timor: Beyond Independence, ed. Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach (Clayton: Monash 
University Press, 2007), 239. 
7 Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "The Authoritarian Temptation in East Timor: Nationbuilding and the Need 
for Inclusive Governance," Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (2006): 584-85. 
8 Damien Kingsbury, "Political Development," in East Timor: Beyond Independence, ed. Damien 
Kingsbury and Michael Leach (Clayton: Monash University Press, 2007), 23. 
9 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, "Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New 
Clothes?," International Peacekeeping 15, no. 2 (2008): 199. 
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briefly outlines some of the general criticism of liberal peace. This chapter 
introduces the key principles and criticisms of liberal peace which are used to assess 
efforts in East Timor in Chapters II. 
 
Defining Liberal Peace 
 
This section gives an introduction to liberal peace. Liberal peace is an approach to 
conflict that is grounded in liberal and neo-liberal theory and tradition. It assumes 
that liberal structures provide the foundations for sustainable peace, and claims 
creating or reforming political, economic, judicial and social structures to liberal 
standards will foster lasting peace. Liberal peace is a tripartite discourse which 
results in three models of peacebuilding praxis: conservative or statebuilding; 
orthodox or democratic; and emancipatory or civil society.10 Each discourse 
endorses different methods for peacebuilding, while still ascribing to the assumption 
that liberal structures will foster self-sustaining peace. 
 
Competing and overlapping definitions of liberal peace can be found in international 
relations literature. For the purpose of this research, liberal peace is both a 
framework and a discourse which guides modern peace operations. Oliver Richmond 
and Jason Franks define liberal peace as a “normative framework”,11 that is, it is a 
model for approaching conflict and post-conflict situations which employs liberal or 
neo-liberal standards. Liberalism and neo-liberalism are founded on the principle of 
freedom.12 Defence or protection of individual freedom has led to the development 
of a series of rights and institutions fundamental to liberal theory, including positive 
and negative freedoms, democratic representation, constitutionalism, equality before 
the law, private property, and the free market.13 
 
                                                
10 Oliver P. Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," Conflict, Security 
and Development 6, no. 3 (2006). And John Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The 
Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding Discourses," Millennium 36, no. 3 (2008). 
11 Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, "Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia," Security 
Dialogue 38, no. 1 (2007): 27-28. 
12 Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and International Relations," in Kant and Political Philosophy: The 
Contemporary Legacy, ed. Ronald Beiner and William James Booth (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 173. 
13 Ibid., 173-74. 
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The liberal peace approach attempts to foster peace by introducing a number of these 
norms and institutions. According to proponents of the approach, long standing 
peaceful relations between liberal states and the low rate of internal conflict14 
indicate durable peace is achievable through the creation of an effective liberal 
state.15 Liberal peace, therefore, has a two-pronged approach to conflict which 
entails not just ending violence, but also repairing or creating structures that meet 
liberal standards
16
 and, it is assumed, will support peace. In particular, the approach 
endorses the democratisation of government, the marketisation of the economy, the 
establishment of rule of law, the development of human rights, and in some instances 
the promotion of neo-liberal development.
17
 This robust conceptualisation of peace, 
distinguishes liberal peace from traditional approaches to conflict, which consider 
the absence of fighting to be a sufficient form of peace.18  
 
Although liberal peace is the dominant framework informing peace operations, the 
approach is not neutral. The claim of liberal peace that democracy, free markets, rule 
of law and human rights will engender peace has been largely accepted by western 
states, the international institutions that respond to crises, and the professionals 
employed to build peace.
19
 However, the framework promotes particular models of 
political, economic, legal, and social arrangements and in doing so it privileges a 
liberal perspective.20 Where structures do not fit with liberal standards, the approach 
advocates the transfer of liberal models and the reorganisation of society. Mac Ginty 
summarises liberal peace as:  
the concept, condition and practice whereby leading states, international 
organizations and international financial institutions promote their 
version of peace through peace-support interventions, control of 
                                                
14 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 42. 
15 Stein Sundstøl Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the 
Reproduction of Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," International Peacekeeping 16, no. 
5 (2009). 660 and 662 
16 Richmond and Franks, "Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?," 187. 
17 Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond, "Myth or Reality: Opposing Views on the Liberal Peace 
and Post-War Reconstruction," Global Society 21, no. 4 (2007): 491. See also Paris, At War's End: 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 19. See also Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: 
Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, 4. 
18 Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace Democracy, and Free Markets 
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002), 244. 
19 Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, 9. 
20 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 606. 
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international financial architecture, support for state sovereignty and the 
international status quo.21 
 
Liberal peace is informed by a history of political theory and debates concerning 
peace.22 These debates have led to three models or discourse of liberal peace in 
practice, known as conservative, orthodox and emancipatory by Richmond, or as 
statebuilding, democratic peacebuilding, and civil society peacebuilding by 
Heathershaw. Yet despite different methods or techniques employed by each model 
or discourse, the objective continues to be the establishment of liberal structures 
upon which durable peace will develop. Each of these models or discourses is 
considered in turn.  
 
The conservative model of peace, or Heathershaw’s peacebuilding through 
statebuilding, is a top down approach to constructing liberal peace which often 
employs coercive methods to achieve its goal of establishing liberal structures, 
particularly democratic governance and rule of law.23 This may involve military 
intervention and the use of force, or subtler techniques of diplomacy and 
conditionality.
24
 Consequently, the model primarily involves military actors and state 
elites.25 This model of peacebuilding is reliant on ongoing support from donors and 
other external actors.26  
 
Orthodox or democratic peacebuilding is a more moderate model of liberal peace. 
This model or discourse is influenced by constitutional and institutional concepts of 
peace found in international relations theory,
27
 and is directed at developing human 
rights, constitutionalism and property rights.28 It draws a range of actors for support, 
including regional and international organisations, and non-governmental agencies. 
                                                
21 Roger Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace," Cooperation and Conflict 
43, no. 2 (2008): 143. 
22 For a detailed discussion see Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal 
Peace'." 
23 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 619. 
24 Richmond and Franks, "Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia," 29-30. And Richmond, "The 
Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 297. 
25 Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 297. 
26 Richmond and Franks, "Liberal Hubris? Virtual Peace in Cambodia," 30. 
27 For a discussion of constitutional and institutional peace, see Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: 
Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 293. 
28 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 619. 
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While some efforts are made to include the population and cultivate local ownership, 
this approach is still more directed at engaging with elites and some mid level actors 
than interacting with those at the grassroots level.29  
 
The final discourse of liberal peace Richmond and Heathershaw identify is the 
emancipatory model, or civil society peacebuilding. Richmond holds the 
emancipatory model is informed by a more critical expression of liberal peace. It is 
distinguishable from the conservative and orthodox models in its greater emphasis 
on engaging with the local community and the diminished importance of the state. 
Consequently, the key players in the emancipatory model of liberal peace are local 
actors at the grassroots level.30 This model is directed at creating civil peace and is 
concerned with issues of justice, welfare, reconciliation and interpersonal 
relationships.31 While the emancipatory model is more critical than the other models 
of peace, it is still a liberal peace discourse which holds liberalism is universal; 
nevertheless, it also recognises the role of negotiation in the peace process.
32
  
 
While the gradations and discourses of liberal peace have been identified and 
defined, these categories are not fixed, particularly in liberal peace praxis. The 
conservative, orthodox and emancipatory models contain contradictory or opposing 
elements; however, in practice two or more of the models may be present to a 
varying extent during a single intervention.
33
 Indeed, the nature of the conflict or 
post-conflict situation at any given time affects the model of liberal peace employed 
– during times of heavy fighting, coercion may be more effective, while the orthodox 
and emancipatory models need greater stability for success. Heathershaw contends 
that merging between the models is so extensive that is difficult to separate the 
individual discourses.34 At times, all three discourses may combine in a meta-
discourse in which the contestations between the individual discourses increase an 
operation’s dynamism.35 
                                                
29 Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, 8. 
30 Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 301. 
31 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 607-08. 
32 Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 301. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 607. 
35 Ibid.: 620. 
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Liberal peace is therefore a normative framework which is comprised of a series of 
peace models and corresponding discourses; however, the objective of liberal peace 
remains the creation of a liberal society
36
 which will support sustainable peace.
37
 
Liberal peace attempts to build a liberal state through the reformation, creation, or 
liberalisation of social structures. In particular, liberal peacebuilding targets four 
areas: governance, the economy, rule of law, and human rights, and attempts to 
transform these into structures that conform to neo-liberal ideals.38  
 
To summarise, this section has defined the concept of liberal peace as both a 
normative framework and tripartite discourse. It has shown that liberal peace has a 
number of expressions which may overlap or become blurred in practice. However, 
the founding claim of liberal peace, present in each discourse, is that liberal 
structures foster lasting peace. It is this claim that I assess in Chapter II by 
employing an immanent critique. First, however, I briefly outline the rise of the 
liberal peace framework in UN peace missions to demonstrate liberal peace has 
increasingly become the standard blueprint for peace operations. 
 
Tracing Liberal Peace in UN Operations 
 
This section traces the evolution of UN peace operation to demonstrate the 
increasing dominance of the liberal peace framework. UN peace operations 
expanded from limited missions with pragmatic goals and restrictive principles 
during the Cold War, to robust missions with the ambitious goal of establishing 
sustainable peace following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In accordance with the 
liberal peace framework, lasting peace was held to be founded on democracy, good 
governance, free markets, the rule of law, and human rights. Peace operations from 
the 1990s, therefore, began to place great importance on cultivating these elements in 
post-conflict areas.  
 
                                                
36 Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 662. 
37 Richmond and Franks, "Liberal Peacebuilding in Timor Leste: The Emperor's New Clothes?," 187. 
38 Ibid. 
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Peace operations prior to the 1990s were not directed at establishing liberal 
foundations to support sustainable peace. Contemporary operations informed by 
liberal peace, regardless of the particular model, have a robust blueprint for 
managing conflict or post-conflict scenarios which prescribes the liberalisation of 
political, economic, legal, and social sectors of society. During the Cold War, peace 
missions were shaped by the dominant ideology of the period and the reality of the 
superpower standoff. Operations pragmatically aimed to establish negative peace
39
 
and prevent superpower involvement which could escalate minor conflicts into proxy 
wars. Sustainable peace was dismissed as utopian, and operations were limited to 
monitoring ceasefires and troop withdrawals
40
 with the consent of all involved 
parties while remaining impartial.41 
 
Competition between the superpowers also complicated any discussion of what the 
internal institutions of a state should look like. The UN could not have advocated a 
particular form of governance as the “right” model to use because the US and USSR 
each promoted their own brand of governance.42 The US advocated liberal 
democracy which emphasised political rights and the importance of elections. The 
Soviet Union also promoted their own brand of democracy – ‘people’s democracy’ – 
which was characterised by public ownership and governance by a communist party 
for the benefit of the population.43 Similarly, the US and USSR would not agree on 
the “right” economic system. The UN, therefore, avoided issues of domestic 
arrangements in its missions.  
 
The end of the Cold War and the fall of the USSR were celebrated as a triumph of 
liberalism, and without any serious competition, liberalism quickly became the 
dominant global ideology. According to Heathershaw, the end of the Cold War and 
the associated newfound optimism were prompted by a “reductive and teleological 
informed reading of the significance of 1989”.44 The collapse of the Soviet Union 
                                                
39 Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of U.N. Peacekeeping " International Affairs 69, no. 3 (1993): 
456. 
40 Paul F. Diehl, Peace Operations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 44. 
41 Ibid., 57. 
42 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 15. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Heathershaw, "Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses," 600. 
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was viewed as evidence of liberalism’s superiority, and liberalisation was thus 
increasingly offered, and accepted, as the solution to a variety of social ills.45 The 
faith in liberalism and liberalisation began to find their way into peace operations.  
 
The fall of the USSR removed liberalism’s only serious ideological competition and 
liberal ideals concerning government and economics began to spread from their 
western hub around the world. Without a major rival, the US liberal model of 
governance was increasingly accepted internationally and from the early to mid 
1990s, the number of liberal democracies rose significantly as states, particularly 
from the former Soviet bloc, introduced democratic constitutions.
46
 Similarly on the 
economic front, liberal market economics also began to spread with the fall of the 
USSR. Like liberal democracy, the liberal economic system was left without any 
major ideological competition with the end of the Cold War and quickly became the 
dominant model for economics. Claude Ake contends that market economics came 
“close to global theology”
47
 as much of the world rushed to adopt liberal principles 
after the fall of the Soviet Union.48 Even communist states such as China began to 
liberalise elements of their economies.49  
 
Liberal ideology began to influence institutions, including the UN whose own peace 
operations began to adopt a liberal peace framework. In 1992, Boutros-Ghali 
released ‘An Agenda for Peace’ which detailed the new robust approach UN peace 
operations should have and advocated the use of a liberal peace framework. In the 
document, Boutros-Ghali emphasises the importance of the UN’s involvement at 
different stages of a conflict. Before violence erupts, preventative diplomacy can 
ease tensions and potentially avert a crisis; during a conflict, peacemaking and 
peacekeeping can hasten a peace settlement and protect peace once established; and 
after fighting ceases, there is a role for the UN in peacebuilding.
50
 Boutros-Ghali 
                                                
45 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 19-20. 
46 Ibid., 20. See also Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace Democracy, and 
Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century, 251-52. 
47 Quoted in Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 22. 
48 Ibid., 21. 
49 Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace Democracy, and Free Markets in the 
Twenty-First Century, 284. 
50 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting 
of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). Para 20 
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coined the term peacebuilding which he defined as “action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse 
into conflict.”51  
 
It is in peacebuilding that the liberal peace framework is most evident as the 
structures to be supported correspond to the key elements of liberal peace. ‘An 
Agenda for Peace’ recognises the causes of war are diverse and argues that 
international response must go beyond addressing the military issues.52 In particular, 
Boutros-Ghali argues peacebuilding must advance political democracy, establish 
order,
53
 foster economic development, and improve human rights.
54
 These 
recommendations for consolidating peace directly align with the objectives of liberal 
peace. 
 
Overall, this section has briefly traced the rise of liberalism internationally and the 
dominance of a liberal peace framework in UN peace operations following the end 
of the Cold War. Early UN missions were constrained by the superpower rivalry and 
guided by pragmatic but limited goals without reference to liberal peace. Conversely, 
UN peace operations in the early 1990s were affected by the supposed triumph of 
liberalism and the newfound optimism of the period. Declarations were made to 
broaden the UN’s scope and promote sustainable peace. As key UN documents 
show, the new style of peace operations was underwritten by a liberal peace 
framework and greater importance was placed on fostering sustainable peace 
balanced on key structures of liberal societies. Next, some of the general criticisms 
of liberal peace are introduced. 
 
Criticisms of Liberal Peace 
 
Despite becoming the dominant discourse shaping peace operations since the 1990s, 
liberal peace is contested. This section highlights some of the criticisms of the 
methodology of liberal peace. Among the common criticisms is that liberal peace is 
                                                
51 Ibid. Para 21 
52 Ibid.Para 13 
53 Ibid. Para 55 
54 Ibid. Para 5 
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potentially destabilising, that reforms may turn populations against liberalisation, 
and that the approach is neo-colonial, inconsiderate of cultural specificities and too 
formulaic. These criticisms question the methods of liberal peace and in doing so 
also question the extent to which liberal peace is capable of delivering its claim of 
fostering durable peace. 
 
Liberal peace claims to cultivate sustainable peace, however, critics accuse the 
approach of utilising methods which are potentially destabilising.55 Liberal peace 
advocates democratic reform and marketisation because liberal democracies have 
been shown to be more peaceful internally and in their international relations with 
other liberal states.56 However, while mature liberal democracies may be peaceful, 
the processes of transforming to a democracy and market economy can be 
destabilising in states still recovering from conflict,57 particularly when such changes 
are pushed through in short timeframes.  
 
Liberal peace emphasises the importance of democratic governance and free and fair 
elections, however, the transformation to democracy and the holding of elections can 
increase tension and disrupt reconciliation, particularly if the society lacks 
institutions and an active civil society. Political competition is necessary for 
democratic elections; however, in states still recovering from conflict without a 
history of popular participation, political competition can ignite political differences 
among opponents and reinforce divisions within the community.58 Snyder argues if 
elites feel democratisation threatens their position, there is a strong incentive to 
incite belligerent nationalism to maintain their position.
59
 Nationalism constructs 
ingroup and outgroup divisions, solidifying differences rather than fostering 
reconciliation.60 The divisive effect of elections is evident in the Bosnian elections in 
1996, in which the population voted along ethnic lines for extremist parties, rather 
                                                
55 See Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International 
Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 56. Charles-Philippe David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal 
(Mis)Steps in the Peace Process," Security Dialogue 30, no. 1 (1999): 33-34. Paris, At War's End: 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict. 
56 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 42. 
57 ———, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," 56. 
58 David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)Steps in the Peace Process," 33-34. 
59 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: 
Norton, 2000), 32. 
60 Ibid., 70. 
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than for more moderate parties.
61
 Neutral institutions have the potential to overcome 
social cleavages through the regulation of competition, support of civil society, and 
promotion of unity.62 Liberal peace, though, focuses more on elections than on 
building the necessary institutions that will sustain democracy.  
 
Economic reforms endorsed by liberal peace also have the potential to be highly 
destabilising. The restructuring of post-conflict economies at the behest of the 
Bretton Woods institutions focuses primarily on the recovery of the economy while 
the effect these reforms may have on the population is a secondary consideration.63 
The restructuring recommended by international financial institutions generally 
include privatisation of state assets, ending state intervention in the economy, 
eliminating any hurdles to trade and foreign direct investment, and minimising 
government spending overall.64 These reforms may have detrimental effects on the 
population as the economy contracts in the short term, lowering wages, increasing 
unemployment rates, and decreasing the value of the local currency while 
concomitantly pushing up the costs of imported goods.65 These reforms fall heaviest 
on the most disadvantaged in society, increasing inequality and potentially 
aggravating social tensions.
66
  
 
Harsh economic conditions may also jeopardise popular support for peace. Where 
peace is coupled with improvements in living conditions, the population experiences 
a ‘peace dividend’, or a reward for peace. As a result, the peace process is more 
likely to experience widespread support and spoilers are less tolerated by ordinary 
citizens.
67
 Conversely, when austerity measures and a decline in standards of living 
accompany the liberal peace process, there may be less popular support for the 
process and the peace created.68 Such conditions can also create an incentive for 
elites to undermine liberalisation and introduce populist policies that protect local 
                                                
61 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 100-01. 
62 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "The Sequencing 'Fallacy'," Journal of Democracy 18, 
no. 3 (2007): 7. 
63 David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)Steps in the Peace Process," 35. 
64 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 166. 
65 Ibid. 
66 David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? Liberal (Mis)Steps in the Peace Process," 36. 
67 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, 200. 
68 Ibid. 
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producers and markets, while maintaining their authority, similarly threatening peace 
and liberalism.69 
 
Liberal peace is also criticised for being neo-colonial and for lacking cultural 
understanding. Liberal peace has been accused of neo-colonialism because it 
attempts to transfer Western models of governance, markets and social organisation 
to non-Western contexts. Liberal peace, in each of its discourses, involves 
intervention by a third party and the introduction of foreign standards and ideas of 
peace in a host community.70 This focus on reform and foreign standards, some 
critics argue, makes liberal peace modern day civilisation mission.
71
 Furthermore, 
liberal peace is the dominant discourse on peace, drowning out local voices.72 
Proponents of liberal peace believe in the framework’s universality and, therefore, 
are quick to reject local non-liberal alternatives.73 Liberal peace thus preaches 
international ‘best practices’, rather than engaging with local structures.74 However, 
critics argue liberal structures will only become embedded and self-sustainable if 
they are able to meet the specific needs of the population.75 
 
Finally, liberal peace stands accused of being standardised and inflexible in practice. 
Faith in liberal peace and the key components of liberal peacebuilding – including 
democratisation, marketisation, establishing of rule of law and promoting human 
rights – results in a standardised, formulaic response to crises and peacebuilding. As 
Mac Ginty writes, “it becomes peace from IKEA; a flat-pack peace made from 
standardised components.”76 A formulaic approach fails to properly consider the 
local context in which peacebuilding is to take place and the particular needs of the 
                                                
69 Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, 343. 
70 Richmond, "The Problem of Peace: Understanding the 'Liberal Peace'," 296. 
71 Roland Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," Review of International Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 
348. 
72 Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace," 140. 
73 Ibid.: 144. See also Oliver P. Richmond, "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-
Local Hybridity Via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding,"  
http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/intrel/media/becoming_liberal.pdf (accessed 20 January 2011). 7 
74 Marina Ottaway, "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States," in State Failure, Collapse and 
Reconstruction, ed. Jennifer Milliken (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 248. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Mac Ginty, "Indigenous Peace-Making Versus the Liberal Peace," 145. 
16 
 
population.
77
 Critics hold reforms that do not respond to local needs will not survive 
once the international presence departs.78 
 
In sum, this section has looked at some of the broader criticisms of liberal peace. The 
discourse has been accused of methods which are potentially destabilising including 
premature democratisation and economic reform which can exacerbate undercurrents 
of tension and lead directly to renewed conflict or undermine popular support for the 
peace process. Liberal peace has also been accused of being neo-colonial, culturally 
insensitive and too formulaic, which threaten the long-term sustainability of the 
introduced liberal structures. Such criticisms indicate liberal peace is not as 
unproblematic as the discourses suggests, and that the methods of liberal peace as 
well as the structures it reforms, affect the capacity for permanent peace. These 
issues are considered again later in Chapter II, when the specific failings in East 
Timor peacebuilding are reviewed in relation to general criticisms of the approach. 
The next chapter undertakes an immanent critique of liberal peace using the case 
study of East Timor.  
 
Chapter II: The East Timor Case Study 
 
This chapter undertakes an immanent critique of liberal peacebuilding in East Timor 
to assess the extent to which liberal peace meets its own standards of success and 
achieves its claim of fostering sustainable peace on the foundation of liberal 
structures. I argue that liberal peace fails to live up to its own standard of self-
sustaining durable peace because the mechanisms of liberal peace and the emphasis 
on quick transitions lead to weak structures which have the appearance of liberal 
institutions but lack substance and domestic support. Furthermore, liberal peace 
provides a blueprint for peace which fails to consider the needs of the population or 
the specific context in which peace is to be set, weakening popular support for liberal 
structures and failing to create a peace dividend. 
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The criteria for judging whether or not liberal peacebuilding can be deemed a 
success has been the subject of scholarly debate. As a minimal standard, the 
resumption of conflict is viewed as evidence of liberal peace failing, however, 
beyond that there is little consensus.
79
 There is debate over how much conflict 
constitutes a failure – whether the standard should be a certain number of casualties 
or if another international response is called.80 There is also debate over what 
timeframe should be used – if a mission can be deemed a success if there is order the 
moment foreign forces leave,81 or if it can only be judged a success if there has been 
no recurrence of violence within five, ten, or even 50 years.82 However, the absence 
of a return to violence may only amount to negative peace,
83
 while liberal peace has 
a broader definition of peace which includes the presence of elements as well as the 
absence of violence. 
 
A more ambitious method of judging the success of liberal peace operations is the 
application of a maximalist standard or determining whether the root causes of 
conflict have been addressed and resolved. According to Call, there are general and 
particular root causes of conflict.84 General causes are social arrangements that can 
increase the risk of conflict, including inequality and poverty, regardless of the 
context in which they are present. Particular causes are those specific conditions that 
gave rise to a certain conflict; for example in Rwanda these would include ethnic 
tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi. Such a high standard, however, may be 
impractical for measuring the success of liberal peace operations as root causes are 
difficult to uncover and ameliorate, and even highly developed liberal states have 
risk factors for conflict.
85
 
 
Given the limitations of both minimalist and maximalist standards, I have chosen to 
assess liberal peace by employing an immanent critique, or measuring the outcomes 
of peacebuilding against the stated claims of liberal peace. As discussed previously, 
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liberal peace claims that the development of liberal structures offers a solution to 
conflict and will foster sustainable peace domestically and internationally.86 
According to Paris, if this assertion is correct, liberal peacebuilding should not cause 
a return to violence, aggravate old tensions that led to conflict, or create new issues 
which are likely to cause renewed violence.87  
 
East Timor was selected as the case study because it represents one of the most 
ambitious efforts by the UN and international agencies at liberal peace. For a period 
of almost three years, the UN assumed sovereignty of East Timor. During the UN’s 
administration of East Timor, great emphasis was placed on the democratisation of 
politics, the marketisation of economics, the construction of rule of law, and, to a 
lesser degree, the development of human rights: the assumed pillars of sustainable 
peace. Given the extent of the UN mission, East Timor is an ideal case study for 
analysing liberal peace in greater depth. 
 
My evaluation focuses on the liberal peacebuilding endeavours beginning October 
1999 with the handover from the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) to 
the UN administration and ends in 2002 with East Timorese independence and the 
declared successful conclusion of the UN administration. This marks the period in 
which the UN and other international organisations were particularly active in 
attempting to create or reform the key elements of a liberal society. This timeframe 
also matches the lifespan of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET), the mission responsible for overseeing East Timor’s transition to 
an independent liberal state. Consequently, the UNTAET mission is the central focus 
of this discussion; however, the World Bank’s role in the planning of the East Timor 
economy is also considered. In evaluating the longer term success of these efforts at 
liberal peace, events since 2002 are considered, particularly the 2006 crisis. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows: first, background to East Timor and the 1999 
violence are briefly discussed in order to contextualise the UN peace mission. Then, 
an overview of the UNTAET operation is given in relation to the specific goals of 
liberal peace. Then, an immanent critique of liberal peace in East Timor is 
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undertaken which evaluates efforts in democratisation, marketisation, the 
establishment of rule of law, and the promotion of human rights against liberal 
peace’s own standard of success. Finally, some of the weaknesses of liberal 
peacebuilding in East Timor are related to the general criticisms set out in Chapter I.  
 
Background and Indonesian Occupation 
 
This section will give a brief background into relevant East Timorese history. Of 
particular importance is the end of Portuguese colonisation and the political tension 
created by the decision to grant independence to East Timor. These conditions gave 
Indonesia the excuse to occupy East Timor while the international community 
largely turned a blind eye. The organisation of Indonesian rule systematically 
excluded the local population from participation in government, law, and senior 
professional positions, while attempting to suppress civil society. When a change in 
Indonesian government and mounting international pressure opened the door for East 
Timorese independence, the legacy of colonisation and occupation presented major 
challenges to the liberal peace operation that ensued.  
 
East Timor was a Portuguese colony for centuries until political change in Portugal 
began the process of independence. The colonisation of Timor began in the 16th 
century with the arrival of the Dutch and Portuguese who each claimed parts of the 
island.88 In 1893, the island was divided into two: the western side of the island came 
under the control of the Dutch while the eastern side remained Portuguese territory. 
With Indonesian independence from the Netherlands, western Timor became part of 
Indonesia while East Timor remained a Portuguese colony.89 Portuguese rule in East 
Timor was negligent and the colonists invested little in local infrastructure or 
development.90  
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After centuries of colonial rule, political upheaval in Portugal prompted the decision 
to end Portuguese colonialism. The Carnation Revolution ushered in a new 
democratic government in Portugal which recognised its territories’ right to self-
determination and wanted to end Portugal’s economic reliance on its colonies.
91
 
Accordingly, in 1975 Portugal began preparations for East Timor’s independence 
which was scheduled to come into effect in October 1978. To facilitate the transition 
to independence, the Portuguese introduced legislation in East Timor that allowed 
for the creation of an interim government in the lead up to and preparation for 
elections, due to be held in 1976.92 However, the route to independence was 
disrupted by fighting between political parties which escalated into civil war.  
 
Generations of colonial rule had left a legacy in Timorese society: the population had 
no experience in democratic process and no institutions existed to mitigate political 
competition. Consequently, in 1975, political contestation descended into 
widespread violence. The initiation of decolonisation resulted in the emergence of 
three main political parties – Frente Revoluciondria Timor Leste (known as Fretilin), 
Unidio Democratica Timorense (UDT), and Associacao Popular Democratica de 
Timor (APODETI). These parties had conflicting policies towards independence 
which became a source of political tension and competition: Fretilin advocated for 
complete independence; UDT for an initial federation system with Portugal and 
gradual independence; while APODETI campaigned for East Timor to become part 
of Indonesia.93 On August 11th 1975, just weeks after the announcement of an 
interim government and the eventual end of Portuguese rule, UDT staged a coup. In 
response, Fretilin launched its own counter-coup and the country descended into 
civil war.94 Unable to control the violence, the Portuguese administration retreated, 
effectively deserting East Timor.95 
 
Amidst the conflict, independence was declared by two political groups: Fretilin and 
a coalition of the other parties, and Indonesian troops landed in East Timor. Fretilin, 
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militarily superior to the other parties, was able to physically defeat its opposition. 
On November 28th 1975, Fretilin announced East Timor’s independence and sent 
key Fretilin members abroad to obtain international recognition and arms.96 Within 
days of their departure, Indonesian troops began their occupation of East Timor. 
Unable to return these key players spent the occupation in exile, and Fretilin became 
divided between those who stayed and fought, and those overseas who did not 
physically fight the Indonesians.
97
  
 
Indonesia’s occupation and forced annexation of East Timor was largely condoned 
or ignored by the international community,
98
 with the exception of the UN. On 
December 12th 1975, just days after the Indonesian military invaded the small island, 
the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on the issue of Timor. The resolution 
reiterated the “inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and 
independence”, and condemned the use of force as contrary to the UN Charter. 
Further, the resolution specifically denounced the invasion and occupation, and 
called for Indonesian troops to withdraw immediately99 – calls Indonesia ignored.  
 
During Indonesia’s 25 year occupation, democracy, civil society, and development 
all suffered in East Timor. East Timorese were denied significant participation in 
professional and politics occupations.100 The Timorese were structurally 
discriminated against and systematically excluded from premier jobs that were 
reserved for Indonesians.101 Political dissent was not tolerated by the Indonesian 
army who employed a ‘security approach’ to any opposition.102 With no peaceful 
recourse to appeal to government, violence became a regular expression of 
dissatisfaction with Indonesian rule, to which the Indonesian army took a hard-line 
and often violent response to. An estimated 200,000 people were killed during the 
occupation
103
 and there were widespread reports of human rights abuses by 
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Indonesian forces.
104
 The use of Timorese informants further divided the community 
and weakened civil society.105 Despite investing more than the Portuguese in 
education and infrastructure, poverty rates were still high, even in comparison to the 
rest of Indonesia.
106
 The Indonesian occupation, therefore, excluded local Timorese 
from the professional arena, stifled democratic process including civil society, 
encouraging dissatisfaction to be expressed through violence, and did not adequately 
address poverty in East Timor.  
 
The Asia Financial Crisis precipitated the fall of the Indonesian president Suharto 
and instigated a change in East Timor policy. President Suharto’s legitimacy rested 
largely on continued economic growth, so when the Indonesian economy collapsed, 
so too did support for the president.107 Suharto’s successor, BJ Habibie had more 
immediate concerns of shoring up his presidency than of dealing with secessionist 
movements with the same vigour that Suharto exercised.108 Meanwhile, a number of 
different entities were applying pressure on Habibie’s interim government to re-
examine Indonesia’s role in Timor.109 Among those pushing the Habibie 
administration was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which had committed 
billions of dollars to Indonesia’s economic recovery and wanted to reduce high 
military spending in East Timor.110 In May 1999, at the orchestration of the UN, 
President Habibie agreed to a ‘popular consultation’ in East Timor, to determine 
whether the people wanted special autonomy as part of Indonesia or 
independence.111 The consultation was scheduled for August and would been 
overseen by a UN mission (UNAMET), however, security was the responsibility of 
the Indonesians.  
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The ‘popular consultation’ was held on August 30
th
 1999 and showed massive 
support for independence. Despite intimidation and violence from TNI and pro-
Indonesian sympathisers in the lead up to the vote,112 a staggering 98 per cent of East 
Timor’s registered voters turned out to cast their vote.
113
 The result was 
overwhelmingly in favour of independence – around 80 per cent voted for 
independence, while approximately 20 per cent supported continued integration with 
Indonesia.
114
  
 
Immediately following the announcement of results, violence erupted which 
destroyed much of East Timor’s physical infrastructure, caused thousands to flee the 
country, and displaced even more. The scorched earth campaign was carried out by 
pro-Indonesian militia and members of the Indonesian army (TNI), and despite 
claims to the contrary, there is evidence that high officials in the TNI knew of the 
intended campaign of violence or even helped plan and organise it.115 In a matter of 
mere weeks, an estimated 70 per cent of East Timor’s physical infrastructure was 
destroyed.116 Hundreds, possibly thousands of people were killed as those carrying 
out the violence were instructed to kill anyone believed to be over the age of 15.117 
Moreover, three quarters of the population were displaced
118
 and approximately 
250,000 fled the country.119 Among those that fled were the Indonesian professional 
class.120 
 
Under intense pressure, President Habibie agreed not only to a peacekeeping force 
but also announced East Timor’s immediate secession from Indonesia. Faced with 
both moral and coercive pressure from the international community, Habibie 
consented to a peacekeeping force in East Timor.121 The International Force for East 
Timor (INTERFET) was an international coalition headed by Australia and 
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authorised by UN Security Council. The mission was mandated to end the violence 
in East Timor and reinstate order while offering support to UNAMET.122 The UN 
had planned that the popular consultation would be followed by a period of gradual 
independence. Instead, due to the level of violence, gradual separation from 
Indonesia was no longer a viable option and Indonesian occupying forces were 
immediately withdrawn, releasing East Timor without significant preparation.123 The 
UN responded by creating UNTAET to administer the territory in the interim while 
local capacity for independence was built. 
 
In sum, this section has provided a brief introduction to East Timorese history. 
Centuries of colonial rule followed by a brutal Indonesian occupation left the 
population with little practical experience in political self-determination or 
democratic process. Indonesian oppression had also legitimised violence as a valid 
expression of social dissatisfaction. The violence of 1999 itself destroyed much of 
the nation’s physical infrastructure and caused extensive displacement both 
internally and across international borders. Among those that fled were the 
predominantly Indonesian professional class leaving a skills and knowledge gap. 
This is the context in which UNTAET attempted to transplant its model of liberal 
peace. The next section provides an overview of UNTAET’s mission while 
identifying the key characteristics of liberal peace in the mission. 
 
UN Attempts at Creating Liberal Peace in East Timor 
 
INTERFET was able to successfully end the violence in East Timor and in February 
2000, the Australian led taskforce handed over authority to UN administrative 
officials. Where INTERFET had been concerned with ending the violence and 
establishing negative peace, UNTAET was now responsible for (re)building the 
state. The mission was clearly informed by a liberal peace framework and can be 
described as mixture of conservative and orthodox models. Evidence of the influence 
of liberal peace on the mission can be found in the emphasis given to politics, the 
economy, rule of law supported by the security sector, and to a lesser degree, human 
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rights. Each of these elements targeted for liberalisation is detailed below. The 
importance of the structure according to the liberal peace discourse precedes each 
brief overview of the UN’s efforts to liberalise them.  
 
UNTAET was authorised in October 1999 by the Security Council Resolution 1272. 
Headed by Sergio Vieira de Mello, the mandate of the UNTAET mission was broad: 
it was to be responsible for the temporary administration of the territory while also 
tasked with preparing East Timor for independence.124 In its role as administrator, 
UNTAET was given full sovereign power. This encompassed governance, 
legislature and the creation of new laws, and overall executive power.
125
 As Traub 
summarises, “the U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) is not 
just helping the new country's government—it is that government.”126 
Simultaneously, UNTAET was charged with overseeing East Timor’s transition to 
independence. This second function of UNTAET required the administration to 
improve capacity for self-determination.
127
  
 
The UNTAET mission in East Timor had the characteristics of both conservative and 
orthodox liberal peace models described in Chapter I. The UNTAET mission was an 
exercise in statebuilding making it in some respects a conservative peacebuilding 
operation. According to Chopra, the UN failures in Somalia and Afghanistan were 
still fresh in the organisation’s memory, prompting the UN to take a top down 
approach to building a new state apparatus and cultivating peace in East Timor. 
However, in its quest to avoid repeating past mistakes, the UN overlooked the 
contribution local actors could make.
128
 Indeed, no East Timorese representatives 
were consulted during the UN’s planning and research prior to the launch of 
UNTAET, and the UN even rejected modest requests from key political actor, 
Xanana Gusmao, for a Timorese Transitional Council which would have enabled the 
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local population to participate in the process.
129
 Consequently, when UNTAET was 
launched, there were no Timorese on the staff.130 A top down approach and a 
reliance on foreign support – both clearly evident in the UNTAET operation – are 
characteristics of a conservative model of liberal peace.
131
 
 
While displaying some key traits of a conservative or statebuilding mission, 
UNTAET can also be described as an exercise in orthodox or democratic 
peacebuilding. Democratic peacebuilding focuses on the development of institutions 
that will support peace132 while having some concern for the local population.133 In 
accordance with the orthodox style of peacebuilding, the UN’s missions in East 
Timor had some regard for local ownership and participation. The UNSC Resolution 
creating UNTAET declared it necessary for the mission: 
to consult and cooperate closely with the East Timorese people in order 
to carry out its mandate effectively with a view to the development of 
local democratic institutions... and the transfer to these institutions of its 
administrative and public service functions.134  
While UNTAET was criticised for not including Timorese early enough, later efforts 
at ‘Timorisation’ – including more local citizens on the staff – were made.
135
 
Furthermore, the mission involved input from a range of agencies including 
international financial institutions136 and, to a limited degree, non-governmental 
organisations.137 
 
One of the first priorities of liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict societies is the 
democratisation of domestic politics. According to proponents of liberal peace, 
democracy and peace are interdependent. Domestically, democratic states have been 
found to have fewer instances of intrastate conflict than non-democratic states.
138
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This phenomenon is held to be due to the population’s greater influence in politics 
and the containment of conflict to the political arena. Within functioning 
democracies local leaders are accountable to their citizens through regular elections 
which allow the public to show their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with political 
actors. In theory, the threat of elections and the chance of losing power to the 
opposition compel leaders to respond to the needs of the population.139 Additionally, 
democracy recognises different interests within society, and through the process of 
debate and negotiation resolves disputes peacefully through official means without 
parties resorting to violence.140 In societies recovering from conflict, it is the 
assumption of liberal peace that democratisation can redirect competition into 
politics and enable disputes to be resolved at the ballot box rather than through the 
taking up of arms.141 
 
As well as a solution to internal conflict, democratisation is pursued in liberal 
peacebuilding as means of improving international peace. The emphasis on creating 
liberal democracies is driven by evidence, however critiqued, which shows liberal 
states are peaceful in their relations with other liberal democracies.142 Former US 
president Bill Clinton succinctly summarised this phenomenon with the phrase: 
“Democracies don’t attack one another”.143 The exact relationship between domestic 
government and international peace is still unclear, though there are a number of 
theories which attempt to explain the peace between liberal states. Among them is 
the theory promulgated by Kant which holds populations in a democracy have 
greater influence in the politics of liberal democracies, and are generally hesitant to 
pay the heavy social and financial costs of war,
144
 making conflict a potentially risky 
political move and, therefore, a decision democratic governments enter into more 
cautiously.145 Another theory puts forth the claim that conflict is irrational and as 
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rational bodies, liberal states are less inclined to engage in war.
146
 While criticisms 
and weaknesses of this assumed link between liberal states and international order 
have emerged,147 democratisation remains a primary focus of liberal peace praxis to 
improve both domestic and international peace prospects. 
 
In accordance with liberal peace assumptions about the benefits to peace, UNTAET 
emphasised the importance of democratic elections. The organisation of national 
elections took almost two years to achieve. During this period, UNTAET was 
cautious not to work too closely with any political group or to bestow too much 
authority on a non-elected body. These precautions were to avoid inadvertently 
advancing one party’s interests or power, which could affect the outcome of 
upcoming elections.148 Until national elections could take place, UNTAET was the 
sovereign power in East Timor, and more specifically, Sergio Vieira de Mello had 
executive authority. UNTAET did attempt to engage with local non-elected bodies 
such as the National Consultative Council (NCC), but these groups did not have the 
position or authority to greatly influence decisions. Consequently, key national 
decisions were the responsibility of UNTAET.  
 
In August 2001, elections were carried out around the country for the Constituent 
Assembly. The results of the election gave Fretilin a significant majority in the 
assembly which was specifically charged with the drafting of the East Timorese 
constitution. The following April, presidential elections were held, which led to the 
election of Xanana Gusmao as the head of state.149 Following the presidential 
election, East Timor was officially declared an independent state, and the 
Constituent Assembly became the country’s first parliament.150 The elections were 
peaceful, prompting the UN to announce their success and the conclusion of the 
UNTAET mission in East Timor.
151
 With its democratic government structure and 
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constitution, East Timor had the appearance and characteristics of a liberal 
democracy. 
 
A second major focus of liberal peace in practice is the marketisation of local 
economic structures which is held to improve the national economy and reduce 
poverty. The freeing of markets entails encouraging the growth of the private sector 
and reducing government intervention in the economy.
152
 According to liberal 
principles, allowing the market to operate without interference increases efficiency, 
stimulating economic growth at a national and individual level.153 Economic reform 
and marketisation in theory serve peace domestically by reducing one of the general 
causes, or risk factors, of conflict: poverty. Furthermore, it is held that free markets 
and democracy are mutually reinforcing.154 Marketisation is also held to contribute 
to international peace, as trade between states can make the possibility of interstate 
conflict an expensive and unattractive option.155  
 
In East Timor, the World Bank and UNTAET recommended economic reforms that 
were designed to improve growth. UNTAET and the World Bank were influenced 
by the assumption that a formal and open market economy based on private 
ownership was the ideal system for any society and that it would improve East 
Timor’s prospects for peace. The World Bank recommended planting cash crops as a 
means of generating national economic growth through exports.
156
 Cash crops could 
also aid in formalising the economy, facilitate capitalism, and generate greater 
opportunities.157 The World Bank thus introduced agriculture projects that were 
directed at rehabilitating agriculture and promoting agriculture enterprise.
158
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The third key element of the liberal peace framework is the establishment of rule of 
law. Liberal peace advocates the transformation of the judicial system to create rule 
of law, which is defined as:  
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards.159 
The rule of law is fundamental in a market democracy.160 The courts and police 
service ensure democracy and the market function – protecting democratic rights and 
private property, and limiting the power of political leaders.161 
 
In East Timor, the judicial system had been largely destroyed by the conflict. 
Physical structures were damaged and many legal professionals had fled.162 
UNTAET began to completely reconstruct the legal system. The physical 
infrastructure was repaired and it was decided that Indonesian law would be remain 
in place, except legislation which clashed with international human rights.163 The 
next step for UNTAET was the recruitment and training of legal experts. In this task, 
UNTAET elected to hire local Timorese rather than rely on foreign candidates. To 
assist Timorese staff, many of whom had no practical experience, UNTAET offered 
training programmes and initiated a mentoring service with international legal 
professionals.
164
 In less than two years, UNTAET was able to get district courts in 
Dili, Baucau and Oecussi up and running, as well as the Court of Appeal in Dili.165 
 
In conjunction with strengthening rule of law, the liberal peace framework 
recognises the importance of a security sector which provides necessary support to 
both the state and court system. Eriksen holds the security sector is a crucial element 
of statebuilding as he argues, in line with Weber, that one of the primary qualities of 
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a state is that it “successfully claims a monopoly of the means of violence”.
166
 A 
functional security sector is imperative to ensuring no non-state parties attempt to 
challenge the state’s monopoly. Moreover, a security sector is necessary to support 
the judiciary.  
 
Accordingly, the creation of an East Timorese police force was an early and high 
priority for UNTAET. A local police force was central to the UN’s mandate of 
preparing East Timor for independence. To achieve its goal of creating a police 
service, UNTAET included a Civilian Police (CivPol) contingent of 1,250 
international experts.
167
 Between 1999 and 2002, CivPol participated in the 
recruitment and training of cadets for the East Timor National Police (PNTL). 
Significant attention and resources were given to recruiting sufficient numbers, 
though less attention was given to capacity building or ongoing training.168 
 
While UNTAET was successful in creating a police service in a short period, the 
issue of creating a national armed force was more contentious in the UN, and 
therefore did not receive the same attention or support. A number of UN officials felt 
the organisation’s assistance in the establishment of an East Timorese armed force 
would be in opposition to the UN Charter. It was argued that supporting the 
development of a national army which could potentially become a threat to peace, 
was counter to the spirit of the Charter and the function of the UN as an advocate for 
peace.169 As a result, UNTAET played a very limited role in the creation of the East 
Timorese defence force.170 
 
Finally, human rights reform is also considered to be a necessary ingredient in liberal 
peacebuilding. Liberal peace discourse assumes that the introduction or the 
prioritisation of human rights can support other elements of liberal peace
171
 and 
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reduce the causes of conflict.
172
 UN and NGO led human rights reform in the past 
has included encouraging new leaders in post-conflict societies to commit to 
international human rights covenants173 and training sectors of society in human 
rights norms.
174
  
 
In East Timor, UNTAET focused on democratic elections and emphasised that 
institutions must uphold international human rights norms. According to Boutros-
Ghali, democracy is a basic and vital human right.175 UNTAET thus worked towards 
democratic elections and took precautions not to unintentionally affect the outcome 
of such elections by favouring or working too closely with unelected political 
actors.176 Commitment to human rights in institutions is evident in the legal and 
police sectors. Sergio Vieira de Mello, the Transitional Administrator, publicly 
declared in 2000 that success in East Timor would be measured, in part, by the 
UNTAET’s creation of "a credible system of justice in which fundamental human 
rights are respected."
177
 While UNTAET made the decision to keep Indonesian laws 
rather than create an entirely new set of laws in East Timor, these existing laws were 
purged of any articles that were deemed to be out of alignment with international 
human rights norms.
178
 In the security sector, human rights were included in CivPol 
led police training sessions for the newly created national police force.179  
 
To summarise, the UNTAET mission was distinctly informed by liberal peace. It 
combined elements of conservative and orthodox peacebuilding models – seen in its 
top down approach to statebuilding, its late inclusion of Timorese, and the 
involvement of non-state actors. In its drive to create sustainable peace, UNTAET 
focused on the key components of liberal peace: democracy, free market economics, 
rule of law supported by the security sector, and, to a lesser degree, the promotion of 
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human rights. The next section evaluates the successes and failures of each of these 
elements of liberal peace in East Timor by employing an immanent critique and 
utilising liberal peace’s own parameters of success. 
 
Immanent Critique of Liberal Peace in East Timor 
 
The UN led peace operation followed a standardised model of liberal peacebuilding 
in East Timor which focused on four structures: democracy, free market economy, 
rule of law, and human rights. This section assesses each of these elements in turn 
using an immanent critique to evaluate whether liberal peacebuilding in practice 
lives up to its own standards and achieves its goals. In particular, this section is 
concerned with determining whether the institutions that were created, and the 
methods UNTAET employed to construct them, are likely to support long term 
peace in East Timor. One of the key benchmarks I use is the 2006 crisis in which 
protests by soldiers from the defence force escalated into violence. I argue that while 
UNTAET did attempt to repair or establish the key components of a liberal market 
democracy, many of these institutions lack substance and either contributed to the 
violence in 2006, or failed to prevent it. UNTAET, therefore, successfully oversaw 
the transition to independence of a nation with all the markers of a liberal market 
democracy; however, whether these structures will support and sustain peace once 
foreign officials have left remains uncertain. 
 
Liberal peace assumes sustainable peace rests on the foundations of a liberal society; 
therefore, its objective is the creation or liberalisation of these key structures in post-
conflict societies. Liberal peace makes a grand claim, but does peacebuilding in 
practice actually achieve this? Has the application of a liberal peace framework in 
contemporary peace operations indeed fostered lasting peace? If liberal peace is 
correct in its assumptions, Paris proposes that as a minimum peacebuilding should: 
1) not cause fighting to resume; 2) not exacerbate pre-existing conditions 
that previously led to civil violence within the host state; 3) not create 
new conditions within the host state that are likely to spark a resurgence 
of fighting.180 
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Using Paris’ minimum standard as the basis for evaluating liberal peace in East 
Timor, UNTAET efforts at democratisation, marketisation, establishing rule of law 
and developing human rights are considered in greater depth. Particular attention is 
given to whether these structures meet this standard, how UNTAET’s mechanisms 
for creating or reforming institutions affected their form, and what role, if any, these 
institutions played in mitigating or contributing to the 2006 crisis.  
 
In brief, the 2006 crisis was initiated by the firing of almost 600 soldiers from the 
defence force who had gone on strike over perceived discrimination in the army 
against westerners (loromonu) by higher ranking easterners (lorosae).
181
 In April, the 
sacked soldiers held protests over their dismissal, which grew and transformed into 
political protests against the Fretilin government.182 Youth gangs contributed to the 
escalation of violence which the police service and defence force were unable to stop 
or contain.183 Violent skirmishes continued for the next five months, during which 
time, 30 people were killed
184
 and more than 100,000 displaced.
185
 Order was finally 
re-established with the arrival of another international peacekeeping force and the 
launch of new UN mission, UNMIT.186 
 
Democracy 
As detailed in the previous section, UNTAET organised and oversaw national 
elections for the Constituent Assembly followed by presidential elections. While 
these elections were declared to be free and fair and prompted UNTAET to 
announce the mission’s success and conclusion, democracy is more than an 
election.187 Indeed, East Timor may have the infrastructure of a democracy and may 
experience peaceful elections, but the substance and durability of Timorese 
democracy is questioned.
188
 Elections in 2001 led the consolidation of Fretilin’s 
power, while UNTAET’s hierarchical and foreign-led operation did little to train 
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East Timorese in democratic process or encourage civil society. Political tensions, 
popular frustration with politics, and reliance on violence rather than political 
process were major factors in the 2006 crisis, undermining the claim of liberal peace 
that democracy inherently promotes peace.  
 
The Constituent Assembly was democratically elected in 2001 and tasked with 
drafting East Timor’s constitution. Fretilin won 55 out of the 88 seats in the 
assembly and used their majority to create a constitution which both advantaged 
Fretilin and undermined democracy. Known as the ‘Fretilin Constitution’, the 
legislation diminished the power and influence of the president and raised the 
position of prime minister. In doing so, the elected president, Xanana Gusmao, found 
his position was reduced to a figurehead despite receiving a significant majority in 
the presidential election.189 Furthermore, the constitution decreed the Constituent 
Assembly would transform itself into the national parliament without further 
elections. Fretilin was then able to dominate key positions, securing its power and 
influence.190 Mari Alkatiri, the Secretary General of the Fretilin Party was given the 
position of Prime Minister of the newly independent state. Alkatiri’s leadership, 
however, bordered on authoritarianism, as Alkatiri undermined democratic processes 
and demanded all government decisions required his approval.191 Thus, elections 
prior to any serious political opposition to Fretilin and the biased constitution, 
Richmond and Franks argue, “allowed Fretilin to transform democracy into 
dictatorship as it consolidated its political power.”192 
 
The fostering of democracy in East Timor was also undermined by the contradictory 
mandate of UNTAET. UNTAET was charged with a number of tasks, including the 
administration of East Timor and preparing the territory for independence. The focus 
of the single mission was therefore split into short term and long term goals which 
UNTAET was unable to address equally. In its immediate focus on maintaining 
security and the day to day running of a post-conflict country, UNTAET relied on 
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the “logic of peacekeeping”
193
 in which the UN had executive authority and the 
ability to make immediate decisions without the burden of consultation, thereby 
achieving quick results.194 In contrast, the mandate of overseeing East Timor’s 
transition to independence demanded greater local inclusion and participation, 
institution and capacity building, and a more long term commitment.195 UNTAET, 
however, was planned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
which had limited experience in governance.
196
 UNTAET was, thus, better organised 
to achieve short term peacekeeping goals than fostering self-government.  
 
As a result of UNTAET’s bias towards peacekeeping, the operation initially 
excluded the local population, undermining the long term goal of cultivating 
democracy. Despite UNTAET’s objective of facilitating capacity building and civil 
society in preparation for democracy, no East Timorese were included in the early 
stages of its operation. This decision indicates the faith or hubris that liberalisation 
was universal and would take root in any context.
197
 The absence of local actors can 
further be explained by the UN’s determination not to repeat past failures and by the 
mission’s very personnel.198 Chopra contends that the operation, which granted 
power and control over the territory to a handful of officials, either appealed to 
personalities that were “intoxicated” by the idea of power, or “corrupted” others.199 
Timorese were thus excluded in the planning and early stages of statebuilding.  
 
Furthermore, the UNTAET mode of governance, typical of a peace mission, was 
hierarchical, centralised, and employed techniques that were in opposition to the 
objective of creating a self-sustaining Timorese democracy. Decentralisation is 
necessary for the effective management of a democratic state, however, when 
UNTAET arrived it recentralised governance.200 In the planning of the peacebuilding 
operation in East Timor, District Administrators were to have a degree of autonomy 
in decision making and financing throughout the territory. In practice, though, 
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UNTAET was again organised like a peacekeeping mission: it was highly centralised 
and District Administrators were given little independence or authority.201 
Additionally, UNTAET disbanded the reconstruction committees established by 
UNAMET staff in the midst of the 1999 chaos and re-centralised authority.
202
 This 
prevented the UN mission from adequately responding to the pressing needs of 
specific regions and further excluded local voices.  
 
Projects that did include Timorese were either undemocratic or unsupported by 
UNTAET. Limited efforts were made to include the population through the creation 
of the National Consultative Council (NCC) made up of both UN officials and 
Timorese actors, and its replacement the National Council (NC), which was entirely 
made up of East Timorese. However, members of both councils were selected by the 
Transitional Administrator, rather than elected,203 as it was believed elections would 
cause long delays in the establishment of a Timorese consultative body.204 The 
World Bank’s Community Empowerment Project, meanwhile, was actively resisted 
by UNTAET. The project aimed to give the East Timorese experience with popular 
accountability and democracy through the establishment of democratically elected 
district councils and the disbursement of grants. The councils would have the 
responsibility of identifying and selecting community projects to fund.205 UNTAET 
rejected the proposal twice before bowing to pressure from the UN Secretary 
General. Despite rhetoric of democracy promotion and capacity building, UNTAET 
was reluctant to actually hand over control to the population.206 
 
Democracy was also undermined by UNTAET’s lack of accountability to the 
Timorese population which led to a loss of legitimacy as it placed the demands of 
donors over and above the needs of the people of East Timor. Part of the strength of 
an effective democracy is the power a population has to influence governance. A 
democratic government must consider the needs of its citizenry or else it will lose 
control to another party. UNTAET, in contrast, was in essence undemocratic. The 
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administration had not been elected and its staff was predominantly made up of 
foreigners, whose understanding of and commitment to national interests was 
questionable.207 In addition, the Transitional Administration and de Mello, its head, 
had no potential opposition, which allowed the administration to function without 
accountability to the local population. As Chopra argues:  
The Transitional Administrator had always been more concerned with 
international, strategic-level politics, in the capital cities of the UN 
member states and donor governments. They were the real constituency, 
and the source of power and the determinant of his future, more than the 
Timorese people.208 
 
Importantly, UNTAET assumed East Timor was ‘terra nullius’ and so did not 
attempt to engage with existing political structures. The UN’s recruitment 
regulations required staff to be drawn from a range of states rather than enabling the 
organisation to hire purely on the basis of experience or knowledge.209 UNTAET 
staff lacked not only practice in governance, but also awareness of East Timorese 
culture and language.210 Consequently, it became taken for granted in UNTAET that 
East Timor had to be reconstructed entirely from scratch and that there were no 
existing domestic political structures once the Indonesian left.
211
 
 
UNTAET thus approached democratisation in East Timor as though there was no 
competing local paradigm and that the population merely had to be versed in 
democracy for it to take root.212 This assumption was a mistake, as, in the words of 
Chopra, “there is never a [political] vacuum as long as there is a population.”213 
Throughout Portuguese and Indonesian control, traditional structures have continued 
to play an important role in Timorese society. Traditional society was arranged 
around Houses – or ancestry, physically represented by buildings.214 Political leaders 
could only originate from affluent Houses. When the Portuguese arrived, they 
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restructured Timorese society, stripping kings of their official authority and 
introducing village and sub-district chiefs. Despite these changes, kings maintained 
their influence and power either through transitioning from kings into chiefs or 
unofficially.
215
 During the Indonesian occupation, elections at the local level were 
introduced, however, descent continued to play an important role. Candidates were 
either drawn from royal Houses, or attempts were made to uncover links in a 
candidate’s lineage to a royal House. Those with more tenuous links experienced 
less support from a population.216  
 
Rather than engaging with local political structures, the UN attempted to transplant a 
democratic system, which clashed with Timorese traditions and consequently 
suffered from a lack of legitimacy. In response to growing criticism about the 
exclusion of the local population from the statebuilding exercise, UNTAET began to 
appoint Timorese staff in 2000.217 District Field Officers, who acted as coordinators 
between a population and the government at a sub-district level, took on local 
counterparts that were to be trained to eventually replace the international officer. In 
the selection of local officers, however, emphasis was placed on education and work 
experience, often resulting in the appointment of younger individuals with no 
consideration of descent. This contrasted with traditional norms, which valued 
seniority and lineage, and undermined the legitimacy of officials in the eyes of the 
population.
218
  
 
The organisation of UNTAET and the means it employed to establish democracy in 
East Timor may have, in fact, weakened the long term prospects for democracy. 
Rather than focusing on training local actors to assume greater political control and 
authority in preparation for independence, UNTAET centralised the administration 
of East Timor and was initially resistant to including the population in statebuilding 
in any meaningful way.219 This alienated the Timorese from the very political 
processes they were due to inherit. Furthermore, democracy requires political 
opposition and a strong civil society, without which, there is no incentive for those in 
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power to accommodate the needs or desires of a population.
220
 Where these are 
absent, a state may have the appearance of democracy but maintain illiberal 
practices. This represents a serious challenge to democracy – if the new leadership 
uses the rhetoric of democracy while continuing to practice violence or inequality, 
populations can become disillusioned with democracy.221 In East Timor, civil society 
is still developing and political processes which border on authoritarianism, risk the 
possibility of disillusionment. 
 
In regards to Paris’ criteria for the minimum standards of liberal peacebuilding, the 
process of democratisation itself did not immediately cause a return to violence with 
the exit of UNTAET; however, it did lead to conditions that fuelled the 2006 crisis, 
including Fretilin’s consolidation of power. The 2006 crisis was initiated by the 
firing of almost 600 soldiers from the defence force who took to the streets in 
protests that soon escalated and led to scenes of violence. While beginning as a 
protest over perceived ethnic discrimination in the army and the mass firing, the 
protests quickly became sites for airing grievances with the state, including 
suspected official corruption and intimidation, and the lack of transparency in 
government.
222
 Fretilin’s power hold and its style of governance, made possible by 
the actions of UNTAET, thus were among the causes of renewed fighting. 
 
Furthermore, political divisions contributed to the crisis. During Indonesian 
occupation Fretilin became divided over resistance tactics and a split occurred in 
1984.223 Bitterness and rivalry from this split continued to effect politics even after 
independence, making it difficult for political figures such as Mari Alkatiri and 
Xanana Gusmao to work together.224 This division contributed to the 2006 crisis 
through the intentional and unintentional results of political intervention. The 
Interior Minister, the Defence Minister and the Defence Force Chief were all found 
to be responsible for arming civilians during the 2006 crisis to serve their causes.225 
Meanwhile, President Xanana Gusmao met with the disgruntled soldiers which 
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legitimised their complaints and their tactics. He further made public announcements 
which reinforced east/west divisions,226 and led to more violence against 
easterners.227  For his part Prime Minister Alkatiri contributed to civil unrest by 
ignoring correct procedure and deploying the army to control protesting crowds.
228
 
The army, however, did not have the experience or training for crowd control and 
began to fire on the crowd causing injury and death229 and further escalated the 
population’s sense of panic, intensifying the crisis. 
 
The use of violence to express political dissatisfaction and the involvement of 
politicians in the crisis indicate two connected issues. First, that UNTAET was more 
successful in creating veneer of democracy than in cultivating a robust democracy 
supported by institutions and strong civil society. Second, contrary to the assumption 
of liberal peace, the introduction of democracy in East Timor did not automatically 
transfer social conflicts to the political arena; rather violence remained a valid 
expression of dissatisfaction.  
 
Economics 
The second area targeted in liberal peacebuilding is the economy. Efforts in East 
Timor include promoting privatisation and cash crops, and international oversight of 
national funds. While these were directed at stabilising the economy, generating 
growth and preventing corruption or money mishandling, such measures did not 
create peace dividends for ordinary East Timorese. Indeed, despite support from the 
World Bank and revenue from natural maritime resources, the population has not 
benefitted greatly: unemployment, poverty and inequality are all high. One of the 
effects of poor economic development has been the emergence of youth gangs. In 
2006, these gangs were involved in the riots that escalated into violence around the 
streets of Dili. While the economic reforms were not the cause of the 2006 crisis, the 
deterioration of quality of life contributed to the violence, further challenging the 
claim of liberal peace that marketisation will guard against violent conflict.  
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UNTAET was supported by the World Bank in its efforts to liberalise the East 
Timorese economy. Among the areas the World Bank recommended for reform was 
agriculture. The World Bank dismissed plans for a state-owned grain silo and 
abattoir, and public funding for research and development in the field of 
agriculture.230 It argued that such resources would be too heavy a burden on the 
developing state,231 despite the World Bank’s own estimates that 80 per cent of the 
population relies on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries for their survival,
232
 and the 
relief or peace dividend it would offer the population. The World Bank further 
advocated privatisation to improve productivity and to attract investment.233 
 
The World Bank also argued for developing commercial crops in East Timor. 
According to the World Bank view, growing crops for international export benefits 
the economy and increases food security.234 In theory, trade creates cash reserves 
which can function as a buffer in a crisis,235 and a varied source of food supply, 
protecting populations against food shortages due to poor crop yields.
236
 Anderson, 
however, disputes this, arguing cash reserves typically do not withstand state 
emergencies and a heavy reliance on funds and international suppliers is in fact a 
threat to food security.
237
 Nevertheless, the World Bank began to implement its 
programme for agriculture reform in 2001, including creating three Agriculture 
Service Centres to assist in promoting cash crops and agriculture enterprise.238 
 
Besides agriculture, East Timor also has reserves of petroleum and natural gas which 
have enormous potential for economic growth. However, the revenues from these 
natural resources have not been effectively channelled into improving the living 
conditions of ordinary East Timorese. While the maritime territory of East Timor is 
disputed, there are agreements in place with Australia in which East Timor is entitled 
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to a percentage of the revenues from the Joint Petroleum Development Area and 
Greater Sunrise fields.239 Concern that the abundance of wealth could be 
destabilising or create an incentive for government corruption, the international 
community organised foreign oversight of East Timor’s petroleum wealth. Revenue 
from oil and gas is held in a fund managed by the US central bank.240 To ensure 
wealth from oil and gas does not disappear, the Banking and Payments Authority 
calculates the amount of income the East Timorese government can access annually 
without depleting the fund.241  
 
Although the amount the East Timor government is able to access from its petroleum 
fund totals hundreds of millions of dollars annually, this has not been channelled into 
improving living conditions due to poor government capacity. Despite areas in need 
of development and significant revenue from gas and petroleum, the government has 
struggled to spend the proceeds. By the end of the third quarter for the 2006-2007 
financial year, for example, the Timorese government had only spent US$81 million 
of a US$320 million budget.242 The World Bank attributes the failure to translate 
revenue into material improvements for the population to weak government243 – 
which lacks experience and expertise.  
 
As a result of poor government and institutional capacity, marketisation and 
democratisation have not created a peace dividend in East Timor. When petroleum 
revenue is included in national income calculations per person, the country appears 
to have experienced significant economic growth.244 However, the majority of the 
Timorese population are not engaged in the oil sector of the economy and non-
petroleum GDP in fact declined between 2001 and 2005.245 In 2006, it was estimated 
approximately 40 per cent of the population were living in poverty.246 
Unemployment also remained high throughout UNTAET’s mission and after its 
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conclusion.
247
 Furthermore, the weak Timorese government has not effectively 
introduced welfare or development programmes to address chronic poverty and 
unemployment.248 Continued poverty and unemployment increased disappointment 
and frustration among the population over unrealised expectations of 
independence.249 
 
High unemployment among the youth also precipitated the development of youth 
gangs. Youths in East Timor are particularly affected by unemployment. High 
fertility rates and poor economic performance limits the job market’s capacity to 
absorb new entrants. Around 34 per cent of the population is aged between 12 and 29 
years,250 which leads to around 15-20,000 new young people joining the labour force 
each year, while a mere 400 formal jobs are created annually.251 Youths also face 
language barriers. Due to the nascent private sector, most job prospects are with the 
government, where Portuguese is the official language. However, prior to 1999, 
children were educated in Indonesian and many youths do not speak Portuguese, 
posing a barrier to official positions.252 Many youths have migrated to urban centres 
in search of work,253 where youth unemployment is estimated to be around 44 per 
cent, approximately double the rate of non-youths.
254
 Without jobs or studies to 
preoccupy them, the youths began to form gangs. In 2006, these youth gangs, while 
not responsible for initiating the protests or violence, quickly became the main 
participants in the crisis.
255
  
 
The 2006 protests by dismissed soldiers developed into demonstrations of public 
frustration over ongoing unemployment and poverty. By the fifth day of protests, the 
former soldiers were joined by members of the public and became demonstrations 
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against the Alkatiri government.
256
 Among the population’s economic grievances 
were continued high rates of poverty and unemployment.257 Also participating in the 
protests were hundreds of youths, many of them linked to gangs.258 As the protests 
turned into riots, the youths were very active in the crisis – engaging in looting and 
precipitating the dissolution of law and order.259 
 
International efforts at liberalisation and marketisation in East Timor were more 
concerned with strengthening the nation’s economy than improving conditions for 
ordinary people. Reforms should be lauded for their long term scope and objective of 
limiting corruption and government mismanagement, while insuring continued 
petroleum revenues. However, the economic reforms implemented during 
UNTAET’s liberal peacebuilding mission failed to address the pressing situation for 
the significant portion of Timorese citizens living below the poverty line and 
struggling to find employment. UNTAET further under-estimated the importance of 
capable institutions in maximising and channelling economic growth to needed 
areas.  
 
In sum, economic reforms in East Timor failed to meaningfully address poverty or 
unemployment, issues that contributed to the 2006 crisis, and so do not meet the 
minimum standard of liberal peace. International involvement in East Timor’s 
economy focused on creating the infrastructure of a market economy, advocating 
cash crops and privatisation, and ensuring state revenue did not fall prey to 
corruption. While these endeavours were directed at the long term security of East 
Timor’s economy, there was little consideration for ensuring institutional capacity in 
managing the economy, or creating peace dividends for ordinary citizens. 
Consequently, unemployment and poverty continued to affect a significant portion of 
the population, while quality of life declined. These conditions fuelled both 
disillusionment and anger among the general public, and gave rise to youth gangs. In 
the 2006 crisis, protests escalated because they became a “lightning rod” for 
legitimate grievances over the economy,
260
 and youths became the main participants 
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in the crisis.
261
 While economic reforms did not instigate the crisis, it is evident that 
the conditions created by such reforms were a contributing factor in the continuation 
and escalation of the conflict. Thus, economic reforms in East Timor do not meet the 
minimum standard of liberal peace because they failed to prevent a resurgence of 
violence.  
 
Rule of law and Human Rights 
The third and fourth areas of liberal peacebuilding in East Timor were the 
establishment of rule of law supported by the security sector, and human rights. 
UNTAET performed well in creating a functioning legal system, however, the lack 
of resources threaten its ability to support democracy and the market economy. More 
concerning is that the mechanisms and priorities employed by UNTAET in its 
creation of a police service undermine the importance of human rights, and limit the 
police institution’s capacity to operate independently and impartially. UNTAET also 
failed in its obligation as administrator to ensure the defence force had adequate 
legal and institutional foundations, leading to similar problems with capacity and 
management. These weaknesses in the security sector became major factors in the 
2006 crisis, once again revealing liberal peace practice often fails to meet the 
minimum standard of liberal peace theory. 
 
The UNTAET approach to the judicial system has been lauded for emphasising local 
participation and attempting to build capacity. Unlike its approach to staffing in 
other departments, UNTAET recruited East Timorese to fill roles in the judiciary, 
rather than relying heavily on international actors. Those hired were given initial 
training, then ongoing support from international experts.262 According to Beauvais 
the hiring and support of local actors increased the courts’ legitimacy in the eyes of 
the East Timorese public and signified a break from the past in which the judiciary 
was tool of the state and a mechanism for Indonesian suppression.263  
 
Despite such achievements in the judiciary, the court system faces problems with 
resourcing and cultural appropriateness, which limit its ability to effectively 
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administer justice and uphold human rights, and potentially undermine its durability. 
UNTAET effectively rebuilt the legal system, but failed to adequately resource it. 
The court’s lack of funds has led to significant delays in trials and even the release of 
a number of accused perpetrators.
264
 Furthermore, UNTAET focused on the formal 
system based on international best practices rather than incorporating or engaging 
with traditional forms of justice.265 Transplanting foreign models may satisfy donors’ 
expectations of a justice system, but it also risks creating structures that are less 
culturally appropriate for their specific setting.266 In East Timor, an Asia Foundation 
survey found many citizens had concerns over the cost, fairness, and accessibility of 
the formal justice system.
267
 
 
While the legal system has ongoing problems with resourcing and cultural 
appropriateness, overall it enjoys a high level of legitimacy and support from the 
local population. UNTAET’s efforts at developing a national police force, however, 
did not have the same emphasis on capacity building or long term vision, and were 
less successful. In particular, UNTAET’s failure to significantly consult with the 
population in its recruitment of police cadets and its short term approach to the task 
led to serious flaws. UNTAET employed western processes and standards to select 
individuals for the force, rather than working with the local population to recruit 
cadets with the traits and skills that would most benefit the community. For example, 
Hood argues those with knowledge of the English language were favoured, despite 
less than one percent of East Timorese speaking the language.268  
 
Additionally, UNTAET focused on the quick recruitment and training of sufficient 
numbers of cadets rather than on the quality of applicants.269 Consequently, the East 
Timor police force was soon established, but in its haste UNTAET rehired several 
former members of the Indonesian police force. Though vetted, any individual that 
had served on the Indonesian police force was nevertheless part of the enforcement 
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arm of the Indonesian regime and therefore implicated in the human rights abuses 
conducted during the occupation. Their experience and previous work ethic were 
further at odds with the new approach the UN wanted the police force to take.270 
Regardless of this risk, former police professionals were not only rehired for the new 
national police service, but many were also promoted to positions within the higher 
echelons of the police force based on their previous practical experience. By 2006, 
former members of the Indonesian police force made up only a small portion of the 
new service, yet were over-represented at the elite level.271 
 
In its staffing and training choices, UNTAET prioritised speed over East Timor’s 
long term needs, compromising the goal of promoting human rights and capacity 
building. The reliance on former members of the Indonesian police force and the 
promotion of these individuals to high ranking offices threatens the UN’s goal of 
developing and promoting human rights in East Timor. Granting former participants 
in the apparatus of Indonesian occupation key positions in the new security sector 
undermines the police force’s commitment to upholding human rights and threatens 
to allow complacency towards human rights abuse to become systemic. Furthermore, 
UNTAET put the need of creating a police force ahead of the long term need for East 
Timor to have a self-sufficient, independent force. Accordingly, cadets were trained 
quickly but few efforts were made to stimulate capacity building.272 Hood accuses 
UNTAET of poor planning and inadequate staffing. He notes that of the 1,250 
CivPol positions, only two were dedicated to the development of a police force 
institution. Meanwhile planning by the UN’s Civilian Police Division in New York 
focused on achieving police quotas rather than on “developing a viable institution 
with adequate management systems and planning capabilities.”273 
 
UNTAET had a less hands-on approach to the development of an East Timorese 
defence force.274 Indeed, UNTAET was reluctant to assist in the creation of a 
defence force and initially dismissive of the rebel forces. As the territorial 
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administrator, UNTAET had the responsibility of ensuring the security sector was 
supported by institutional and legislative foundations.275 However, the army, like the 
police service lacked institutional capacity from its inception. The army further 
struggled with internal divisions and competition with the police force, issues which 
became factors in the 2006 crisis.  
 
UNTAET failed to recognise the service of Falintil, the rebel force, or its cultural 
significance. Falintil, or Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste 
(Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor), was formed in 1975 and 
originally functioned as the military component of Fretilin. In 1987, as a result of the 
Fretilin split, Falintil separated from Fretilin to become a politically neutral army.276 
During the 1999 crisis, Falintil displayed remarkable self-discipline and did not 
engage with the Indonesian army, in the knowledge that escalating violence could 
risk international intervention.277 Yet despite Falintil’s long-term involvement in the 
resistance and its support of the UN mission, UNTAET considered it to be an illegal 
armed force and attempted to disarm the fighters.278 UNTAET, Paulo writes:  
did not allow Falintil to participate together with its own military 
component in the security patrols around the territory (even though 
INTERFET did benefit from their local intelligence, local knowledge, 
and general advice in the earlier phase). Despite Falintil's past role and 
historic legitimacy, it was placed under cantonment and conveniently 
sidelined...
279
  
 
When the Timorese decided to create a domestic defence force, UNTAET was 
reluctant to become involved due to a perceived conflict of interest. Nevertheless, 
UNTAET, as East Timor’s administrator, was still responsible for ensuring the 
defence force had an institutional framework and capacity to operate effectively. 
However, UNTAET failed in this duty. The Timorese relied on support from 
bilateral donors in the development of the defence force, rather than the UN.
280
 Even 
though it was not managing the development of the army, as administrator, 
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UNTAET should have set the foundations of the defence force “in the form of basic 
legislative and planning documents, administrative support and mechanisms for 
democratic control, or to develop a national consensus on security policies and 
structures through consultations.”
281
 No such initiatives were implemented by 
UNTAET,282 and the defence force struggled with institutional weaknesses and 
internal divisions in the lead up to the crisis.  
 
In 2006, army and police institutional weaknesses were directly responsible for the 
emergence and escalation of the 2006 crisis. Divisions with the defence force 
between easterners and westerners developed but institutional weaknesses led to the 
mismanagement of the tension. Perceived discrimination of westerners by easterners 
prompted soldiers from the west to petition political leaders and later go on strike.283 
When army officials responded by dismissing those on strike, the former soldiers 
began protesting. As the protests grew, Prime Minister Alkatiri called on the army to 
restore order. The perception that those still in the army were pro-easterners and 
those protesting were pro-westerners fuelled ethnic divisions.284 
 
Competition between the army and police further escalated the crisis. From 2002, the 
police force was increasingly politicised as Rogerio Lobato, a long-standing member 
of Fretilin, used his position as the Interior Minister, to recruit new police staff based 
on their loyalty to him.
285
 Without clear delineation of the intended roles of the army 
and police, the two security sectors competed and clashed over common tasks. 
Because the police units had access to better resources than the army and were paid 
more, tensions between the police and army grew.
286
 Allegations of human rights 
abuses by police officers as well as corruption began to surface, further intensifying 
the tension between the police and army.287 As the protests grew, police and army 
troops clashed, and in one incident, soldiers killed ten unarmed police officers.
288
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UNTAET’s approach to security, therefore, was underwhelming and failed to meet 
the standards of liberal peace. Once again, peacebuilding efforts in East Timor 
concentrated more on creating the framework of liberal rule of law with the 
expectation that this would naturally protect against renewed conflict once UNTAET 
left; however, these institutions lacked substance and quickly degenerated, 
contributing to the 2006 crisis. UNTAET’s emphasis on speed in developing the 
national police force sacrificed capacity building, undermining the potential strength 
and robustness of the institution, as well as weakening the UN’s message of human 
rights. Moreover, in its reluctance to lead the development of a defence force lead, 
UNTAET failed in its duty as administrator to ensure the army was supported by 
legislation and clear planning. Consequently, the police and defence force suffered 
from institutional weaknesses leading to competition between them, politicisation of 
the police, and poorly managed factions within the army. These weaknesses caused 
the initial crisis and escalated the violence of the crisis. The police and defence 
services have since been dissolved and targeted for reform by the latest UN mission 
and the East Timorese government in a bid to improve these services.289  
 
Thus, liberal peacebuilding efforts that targeted rule of law and human rights were 
not effective in fostering long-lasting peace. UNTAET’s efforts, particularly in 
relation to establishing rule of law supported by the security sector, aggravated social 
tensions and failed to provide the police and army with essential institutional 
support. Despite liberal peace claims about the potential for rule of law and human 
rights to engender durable peace, in East Timor, human rights were subverted for 
convenience and speed, and the security sector was directly responsible for the initial 
outbreak of protests and contributed to the violence.  
 
Liberal Peace Weaknesses in East Timor 
 
The East Timor case study illustrates a number of the criticisms of liberal peace set 
out in Chapter I. In particular, the poor outcome of liberal peacebuilding in East 
Timor can be attributed to its formulaic top-down approach, its disregard for local 
needs, and its failure to deliver peace dividends. These failings resulted in weak 
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institutions with insufficient domestic support and limited the sustainability of peace, 
and the state, without international support.  
 
First, the methods employed by UNTAET illustrate the potential for liberal peace to 
be hierarchical and formulaic in practice. Liberal peace relies on external 
intervention with limited dialogue with the affected population.290 In East Timor, the 
UN failed to include any Timorese in the initial planning of the mission. Timorese 
were also missing from UNTAET until domestic pressure forced the project to 
include more local staff.291 The hierarchical organisation of UNTAET limited the 
involvement of the local population in constructing the new state, and limited the 
training of Timorese officials prior to independence. Furthermore, the singular 
objective of developing a liberal state, as imagined by the interveners and without 
any input from the population, creates a power dynamic in which the “the 
relationship between donors and recipients becomes one between subject and object, 
where all key decisions are made by one party and applied to the other.”
292
  
 
Second, the case study also illustrates the lack of consideration for local culture in 
the liberal peacebuilding agenda. Liberal peace believes in the universality of 
liberalism and assumes once liberal structures are in place they will be operational 
and self-sustaining. Therefore, peacebuilding introduces reforms without much 
consideration for whether or not such changes are culturally appropriate.
293
 
However, East Timor illustrates that there are always existing political structures and 
practices which may clash with liberal ideas and need to be considered. Furthermore, 
unless introduced or liberalised structures are culturally relevant, they risk limited 
popular support and possible collapse.  
 
Third, liberal peace fails to deliver peace dividends. Liberal peace follows a 
blueprint of reforms and liberalisation which do not adequately consider the effects 
                                                
290 Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 663. 
291 Paulo, "The Legacy and Lessons of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor," 319. 
292 Eriksen, "The Liberal Peace Is Neither: Peacebuilding, State Building and the Reproduction of 
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 663. 
293 Hohe, "The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration and Local Political Legitimacy in 
East Timor," 570. 
53 
 
on the population. In East Timor, much of the population was experiencing chronic 
poverty and unemployment. Rather than engaging with the population, hearing their 
needs, and cultivating conditions that would address these issues and improve the 
everyday lives of ordinary Timorese, the UNTAET mission focused on creating the 
infrastructure of a liberal state,294 in the assumption that order and development will 
naturally follow liberalisation.295 Instead, poverty and unemployment continued, 
fuelling disillusionment with independence and contributing to the resurgence of 
violence in 2006.296 East Timor poignantly demonstrates the criticism that if peace is 
not accompanied by improvements in conditions, it will receive less popular support.  
 
Chapter Summary 
 
In sum, evaluating liberal peace in East Timor against the discourse’s own minimum 
standard of success has shown that liberal peacebuilding in this case was not 
successful in fostering sustainable peace. Significant international attention was 
given to the four critical areas of democratisation, marketisation, rule of law and 
human rights; yet despite creation or reformation of the supposed foundations of a 
liberal society and sustainable peace, East Timor descended into violence in 2006 
which only ended with the arrival of another international peacekeeping force and 
the launch of a new UN mission.297 Indeed, many of the institutions reformed or 
liberalised by international organisations were weak, lacked domestic support, and 
contributed to conditions of disillusionment and anger which were expressed through 
violence in 2006. Thus, the liberal peace operation in East Timor cannot be judged a 
success. Moreover, this case study illustrates that a number of criticisms of liberal 
peace methods are legitimate. In the next chapter I argue despite these weaknesses 
liberal peace still has merit and is a legitimate response to conflict. Liberal peace 
should therefore be reformed rather than discarded.  
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Chapter III: Lessons from East Timor 
 
The previous chapter employed liberal peace’s own standards to evaluate its 
successes and failures in East Timor. Despite being the dominant discourse or 
framework informing peace missions, the East Timor case study indicates liberal 
peacebuilding has the potential to contribute to renewed conflict or at least fail to 
prevent it. Liberal peacebuilding in practice, therefore, does not foster the peace 
envisioned in its ideology and is not a “silver bullet” for conflict and unrest. 298 This 
assessment puts into doubt liberal peace’s claims that liberalisation is the basis for 
sustainable peace, and justifies renewed thinking about the application of liberal 
peace.  
 
This chapter argues that despite significant flaws in its methodology, there is still 
potential for liberal peace to mitigate social unrest. Therefore, I do not advocate the 
abandonment of a liberal approach to peacebuilding; rather I follow the lead of Paris 
in calling for reform from within liberal peace discourse.299 Three recommendations 
are put forth to strengthen and improve liberal peacebuilding: efforts at peace should 
move away from the standardised approach; there should be greater involvement 
from the local population and more consideration for their needs; and greater support 
should be given for capacity building and institutions.  
 
Despite weaknesses in the methods of liberal peace, alternatives including giving 
war a chance, long term trusteeships, and relying on local leaders, are not viable, and 
thus liberal peace should not be abandoned. According to Paris, forgoing 
intervention to give war a chance may result in military victory and a more durable 
settlement; however, it also risks an increased humanitarian crisis, and a more 
prolonged conflict that may spill over into neighbouring states.
300
 Another 
alternative to liberal peace could be an illiberal, indefinite trusteeship of conflicting 
societies by international agencies, although such an arrangement would be even 
more neo-colonial and hierarchical than liberal peace and likely lack the support of 
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the population. Even the reliance on local leaders rather than democratic elections is 
problematic as these individuals could work to increase and consolidate their own 
power base through potentially violent means.301  
 
Considering the shortcomings of alternatives and the potential benefit of stable 
liberal states locally and globally, the liberal peace approach does have merit and is 
therefore deserving of reform. As previously detailed, evidence indicates that mature 
liberal societies are indeed more peaceful internally and in their relations with other 
liberal democratic states.302 Assisting states in becoming more liberal is thus a 
warranted approach to minimising future conflicts. Furthermore, despite weaknesses 
in its application, liberal peace operations have not done more harm than good in 
their host countries.303 Given the absence of alternatives and the potential of liberal 
peace, the approach should be reformed to minimise the negative effects and 
maximise the extent to which it facilitates long-term peace, rather than discarded.  
 
First, liberal peace should move away from a standardised approach to 
peacebuilding. Liberal peace has become a formulaic response to post-conflict 
situations. It uses the same rigid blueprint and even many of the same people for 
fostering peace in host states.304 Yet, formulaic approaches and international ‘best 
practice’ are not necessarily the appropriate response to local problems.305 A 
standardised model excludes the local population from the reformation process and 
denies them the right to determine the character of their state and its institutions.306 
This weakens the foundations of the state as introduced institutions and norms are 
unlikely to have the necessary grassroots support. If these institutions do not have an 
impact on local issues, they will fail to become embedded307 or may be co-opted by 
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illiberal elite interests.
308
 Moving away from a formulaic approach will allow liberal 
peace operations to become more responsive and culturally appropriate.  
 
Second, liberal peacebuilders should prioritise learning about the context in which 
the peace operation is set and the specific needs of the population. This would enable 
liberal peace to become more nuanced, and broaden its scope from constructing 
detached liberal structures to creating meaningful structures that are liberal in 
character but are also culturally relevant. Understanding the specific cultural context 
of peace operations will also help peacebuilders to identify local paradigms. 
International efforts to rebuild or reform post-conflict societies should then build on 
or integrate these paradigms to create more legitimate, durable structures.309 
Working in close partnership with a host population will also enable the fusion of 
local and liberal ideas. This synergy or hybridisation will make liberal ideas 
“domestically relevant” and may even cause local ideas to affect and change 
international liberal norms.
310
  
 
Greater understanding of the context of a peace mission will concomitantly allow for 
greater understanding of the specific needs of a population and an increased ability 
to respond to these. Richmond and Franks accuse liberal peace of prioritising the 
reformation or construction of institutions which have a limited impact on the lives 
of the population.
311
 In doing so, liberal peace prioritises rights and overlooks the 
importance of culture and needs. However, a state is more than its physical 
infrastructure and the security and dignity of its population should also be advocated 
and protected.
312
 The population and their everyday experience should therefore be 
at the centre of peacebuilding;313 and improving conditions for ordinary people 
should be the new top priority of liberal peace. Putting the population first will create 
greater peace dividends and allow peacebuilders to develop key areas as identified 
by the population.  
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Third, as Paris argues,314 more efforts should be made to strengthen supporting 
institutions before liberalisation, rather than rushing political and economic reform 
prematurely. Democracy, capitalism, rule of law, and human rights require a network 
of public institutions to operate, yet liberal peace takes the existence of a state and 
supporting structures for granted.315 Democracies, for example, require an active 
civil society, restrictions on state power, public debate, impartial media, and political 
opposition.316 However, many communities emerging from conflict lack the 
necessary framework to support and sustain a liberal state.317 As a result, liberal 
peacebuilding has created liberal pillars in post-conflict communities which have 
eroded or been corrupted without the support of institutions.  
 
Liberal peace must abandon its blueprint and identify what institutions are missing 
or in need of support in a particular setting, before liberalising politics and 
economics. For democratisation to be a success, Snyder recommends that first a 
middle class must have developed, followed then by a free and responsible press as 
well as civic societies – only once these elements are present should democratic 
elections be held.
318
 International peacebuilders have a role to play in fostering these 
conditions. Rather than pressing for quick elections, international actors can delay 
elections until moderate political parties with a degree of popular support have 
emerged and an impartial judicial system capable of mediating political disputes has 
been created.319 Peacebuilders can also assist in creating an electoral system which 
fosters cooperation among factions, and encourage or reward good civil society.320 
Free media could be regulated by international actors until local laws and regulating 
bodies are created to ensure the press does not become a vehicle for division and 
hatred.321 Finally, economic reforms could be delayed or introduced slowly to create 
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peace dividends and allow for the necessary supporting government and legal 
institutions to be developed.322 
 
To summarise, in this chapter I have argued that while liberal peace is not the 
panacea it is presented as in the discourse, given the absence of any viable 
alternative and the link between liberal structures and domestic and international 
peace, liberal peace should be reformed rather than discarded. In particular, liberal 
peace should move away from its standardised approach, work in greater cooperation 
with local populations to determine their specific needs, and focus on strengthening 
the institutions that will support a liberal society before embarking on liberalisation. 
The final chapter offers a summary and brief discussion of the challenges for liberal 
peace reform.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this thesis has provided a critical analysis of liberal peace. In particular, 
I assessed the extent to which liberal peacebuilding does indeed offer a solution to 
conflict and social unrest as it claims by undertaking an immanent critique of the 
liberal peacebuilding efforts in East Timor during the UN administration from 1999 
to 2002. The critique found that the methods of liberal peace limit its ability to foster 
lasting peace.  
 
Liberal peace holds that lasting peace is achievable and necessarily founded on 
liberal structures. The approach began to dominate peace operations from the 1990s. 
The end of the Cold War was interpreted as a triumph of liberalism, and without an 
ideological competitor, liberalism began to spread internationally. Liberal ideology 
increasingly came to influence politics, economics, and even the character of peace 
operations. No longer constrained by the superpower standoff, the UN began to 
envision more robust operations which would end violence and cultivate sustainable 
peace. A reflection of the UN’s new approach, the writings of Boutros-Ghali endorse 
liberal peace and advocate the identification and support of structures of peace. In 
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practice, UN peace operations began to focus not just on monitoring and separating 
conflicting parties, but also on promoting and enabling democracy, free markets, rule 
of law and human rights. 
 
The UNTAET mission in East Timor was in many ways a classic example of a 
liberal peacebuilding operation. Given absolute authority over the territory, 
UNTAET was unrestricted in its pursuit of transforming East Timor into a liberal 
society capable of supporting lasting peace. Accordingly, UNTAET, with the aid of 
other international agencies, followed the standard approach to liberal peacebuilding. 
Elections for a Constituent Assembly and the presidency were scheduled for 2001 
and 2002 respectively. Until democratic elections could take place, the amount of 
power or authority any local body had was limited so as not to influence the 
upcoming elections. Simultaneously, UNTAET and the World Bank sought to 
introduce economic reforms that would address subsistence living and the informal 
economy, improving the conditions for private enterprise and foreign investment. 
UNTAET was also directed at establishing rule of law and promoting human rights 
through the reform of the judicial system and security sector. 
 
In 2002, following successful elections, East Timor achieved independence and the 
UN announced the conclusion of the UNTAET mission. In less than three years, 
UNTAET claimed to have achieved its goal of creating a liberal state in East Timor. 
However, while East Timor had the veneer of a liberal democratic state, the 
immanent critique of the liberal peace process highlighted major problems in each of 
the four key areas of the UNTAET mission. 
 
These weaknesses either directly led to violence in 2006, or at the very least, failed 
to prevent the crisis. Democracy enabled the consolidation of Fretilin’s power and 
failed to end the validity of violence as an expression of political dissatisfaction. 
Economic reforms did not sufficiently address widespread poverty or 
unemployment, and failed to create a peace dividend for the population. 
Unemployment among the youth contributed to the formation of youth gangs who 
were heavily involved in the protests and violence. Major achievements were made 
in the judicial sector which receives ongoing support from international experts and 
enjoys legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, the police service suffered 
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from weak institutional capacity, questionable human rights, and political bias, while 
the defence force also suffered from weak capacity. The mishandling of soldiers’ 
grievances by defence force elites and the rivalry between the police and defence 
forces were also major factors in initial emergence of the crisis and in the escalation 
of violence.  
 
These weaknesses challenge liberal peace’s claim that reforming and supporting 
liberal structures in post-conflict societies will foster lasting peace, and illustrate a 
number of weaknesses with the approach. In particular, liberal peace can be 
hierarchical and formulaic, dismissive of local context, and can neglect ordinary 
citizens and the importance of a peace dividend. Furthermore, the immanent critique 
demonstrated liberal structures in and of themselves do not automatically guard 
against the resurgence of violence, and the methods of liberal peacebuilding are as 
important as the structures being created or reformed.  
 
Despite its limited success and the weaknesses highlighted in the immanent critique, 
liberal peace should be reformed rather than replaced. Liberal societies are 
associated with lower rates of conflict internally and with other liberal states, and 
there is no viable alternative to the liberal peace. Therefore, liberal peacebuilding is a 
legitimate approach to conflict and has the potential to reduce violence in the long 
term. In order to minimise the harmful or negative effects of liberal peace, I 
recommended reforming some of the mechanisms of liberal peace, including: ending 
the reliance on a standardised approach to peacebuilding; devoting greater attention 
to the specific context of the operation and the particular needs of a population to 
ensure the peace created improves the lives of ordinary people; and that institutions 
should be developed prior to liberalisation.  
 
Liberal peace has already shown a capacity for change. Following the varied results 
of early liberal peace operations, peacebuilding from the late 1990s turned towards 
gradual liberalisation and has paid more attention to the institutions that will support 
liberal structures.323 Now is the time for liberal peace to evolve even further. 
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The challenge lies in changing expectations of policymakers and ensuring ongoing 
political will. A reformed liberal peace approach will require longer timeframes to 
achieve its objectives, and donors’ expectations of peacebuilding need to become 
more realistic. Building a liberal state with embedded and locally meaningful 
structures cannot be achieved in one or two years; it may not even be achieved in ten 
years. Consequently, reformed liberal peacebuilding will require an open-ended 
commitment from donors, a commitment policymakers are unlikely to embrace. 
While long-term commitments may be costly, they are nevertheless more cost 
effective in the long-run if such operations succeed in fostering sustainable peace.324 
Meanwhile, donors and peacebuilders will have to change their methods for 
measuring success. Donor demands for visible results have led practices that do not 
benefit the greater goal of self-sustaining peace.325 
 
These recommendations for liberal peace and donors are a tall order indeed. 
Advocating change within an industry as enormous as the peace industry is 
ambitious, and calling on donors to be more generous with resources and less 
demanding may similarly be dismissed as fanciful. But, while implementing the 
recommendations is ambitious, so too is the project of lasting peace.
326
 If 
policymakers are serious about supporting self-sustaining peace they need to have a 
more accurate appreciation for the complexity of peace, and a more nuanced 
approach.  
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